On November 4, 2026, the ICLMG submitted our brief on Bill C-22, the Lawful Access Act, to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs for their study of the legislation.

Read the introduction and our recommendations below, or the full brief here.

Over the past two decades, successive federal governments have attempted to weaken privacy protections under the name of ‘lawful access.’ However, each time, privacy experts, human rights and civil liberties advocates, and the general public have refused to trade the important protections that privacy laws afford us in exchange for promises of “security” built on nebulous justifications that these powers are necessary for law enforcement. Our coalition has contributed consistently to these conversations, through op-eds, briefs, consultation submissions and committee appearances.

There has also been a pattern, including regarding Bill C-22, of law enforcement arguing that new investigatory powers are necessary to address novel challenges whereas evidence shows that tools and powers that would allow them to adequately address these problems already exist. As described by the Citizen Lab, while law enforcement may present these issues as a blockage, in reality they are experiencing investigatory friction: difficulties exist, but investigations can still be carried out effectively. Furthermore, as detailed by Professor Michael Geist, the government has once again failed to present convincing evidence or scenarios to justify the reforms they are seeking in this legislation.

Position on Bill C-22

Our coalition is deeply concerned that, if enacted, Bill C-22 will significantly expand state surveillance and seriously threaten privacy rights, with concurrent impacts on free expression, freedom of association, and equality rights.

This legislation presents one of the greatest threats to privacy in Canada of the past two decades. Its provisions will weaken the rules governing police access to personal information, all while facilitating a vast expansion of government surveillance, and create a treasure trove of data that will be catnip to hackers. It is one more case in the decades-long trend of Canadian governments using national security as an excuse to erode civil liberties and human rights.

We acknowledge that the House of Commons adopted several amendments meant to address the concerns we and others have raised, but for the reasons explained below believe that they have failed to address the underlying problems with Bill C-22.

General recommendation: Based on the concerns below, Bill C-22 should not proceed to Royal Assent and should instead be withdrawn, reconsidered and subjected to further consultation. In the alternative, outstanding concerns with Part 1 of the Bill should be addressed through targeted amendments, while Part 2 should be removed altogether.

Part 1: Timely Access to Data and Information

a. “Information Demands” vs “Confirmation of Service”

Recommendation 1: That the committee fully examine the impact of precedent-setting warrantless Confirmation of Service Demands

Recommendation 2: That clauses 5 and 31 of Bill C-22 be amended to require annual public reporting by law enforcement and CSIS and/or the federal government on the use of Confirmation of Service Demands

b. Production orders for subscriber information

Recommendation 3: That clauses 6 and 7 of Bill C-22 be amended by replacing “reasonable grounds to suspect” with “reasonable grounds to believe”

Part 2: Supporting Authorized Access to Information Act (SAAIA)

Of greatest concern in Bill C-22 is the proposed creation, in Part 2 of Bill C-22, of the Supporting Authorized Access to Information Act (SAAIA).

Recommendation 4: Ensure Bill C-22 receives a full study, hearing from civil liberties, human rights, privacy, and cybersecurity experts.

Recommendation 5: Withdraw Part 2 as it can’t be amended in a way that upholds Charter rights.

Key issues with Part 2 of Bill C-22:

Issue 1: The definition of electronic service providers is unacceptably broad

Issue 2: Order making powers threaten privacy and security online

Three areas of risk are especially worrisome:

2.1 Bill C-22 will weaken online security and render encryption meaningless

2.2 Mandatory retention of metadata violates privacy rights

2.3 Secret orders undermine accountability, place rights & security at risk

Issue 3: How these powers could be used and associated risks

Issue 4: Inadequate safeguards and unjustified secrecy

4.1 Systemic vulnerabilities

4.2 Reporting requirements do not replace effective oversight

Conclusion

In response to Bill C-2, hundreds of civil society organizations spoke out how the bill’s new surveillance powers posed a serious attack on fundamental rights in Canada. While Bill C-22 makes modest efforts to address these concerns, it continues to pose not just a risk to privacy rights, but a wide range of associated rights that depend on access to private communications free from undue government surveillance and interference. Bill C-22 also unjustifiably creates cybersecurity risks that will further threaten the private information not just of people in Canada, but all individuals whose data is held by ESPS subject to the new regulations and secret orders regime created in the SAAIA. Over the past several months, privacy experts and civil liberties advocates in Canada have been joined by international experts, technology companies and law makers in echoing the need for the government to change course on Bill C-22.

Given these concerns, our coalition is calling on Senators to reject Bill C-22 and to vote against it. Barring that, significant amendments must be made to Part 1, and Part 2 must be withdrawn.

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